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Recent studies showed that one third of the Belgian coastline is not sufficiently protected against severe storm events. 
Therefore coastal protection plans are set up to assure a minimum safety standard for the entire coastline. Flood risk 
calculations constitute the main input parameter for the concept and planning phases. Since 100% safety can never be 
guaranteed, contingency plans are constructed to reduce the remaining flood risks. Flood risk calculations are a powerful 
communicative and operational instrument to use between engineers and experts on the field, thus forming the link between 
coastal management and disaster planning. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The Belgian coast is situated at the southern part of the North Sea between The Netherlands and 
France. The coastline is 67 km long consisting mostly of sandy beaches with sea walls in front of the 
cities and dunes in between. There are 4 harbours at Nieuwpoort, Oostende, Blankenberge and 
Zeebrugge and a tidal inlet at the border with The Netherlands, called the Zwin.  
This small stretch of land is intensively used by different stakeholders. Aside from housing the 
coastline is landmarked by nature reserves, tourism and industry. Nevertheless, the low-lying polders 
in the hinterland form a 15 kilometer wide flood prone area in which about 400.000 people live (Fig. 
1). This area is situated about 2 meters under the level of an average storm and without appropriate 
coastal protection it would flood every year.  
 
 
Figure 1. The low-lying polders at the Belgian coastline 
 
Recent studies showed that one third of the coastline is not sufficiently protected against severe 
storm events. Therefore coastal protection plans are set up to assure a minimum safety standard for the 
                                                          
 
1 Belgian Coastal Division, Vrijhavenstraat 3, Oostende, 8400, Belgium 
2 Flanders Hydraulics Research, Berchemlei 115, Antwerpen, 2100, Belgium 
³ International Marine and Dredging Consultants, Coveliersstraat 15, Antwerpen, 2600, Belgium 
1 
4 Flemish Institute for Technological Research (VITO), Boeretang 200, Mol, 2400, Belgium
 COASTAL ENGINEERING 2010 
 
2 
entire coastline. Flood risk calculations constitute the main input parameter for the concept and 
planning phases. 
Since 100% safety can never be guaranteed, contingency plans are constructed to reduce the 
remaining flood risks. 
 
CHAIN OF SAFETY EMBRACED BY THE FLOOD DIRECTIVE 
Since flooding disasters do not stop at local, regional or even national borders, and neither do the 
effects of such disasters, transnational cooperation in contingency planning is very important. 
In the framework of a European project Chain of Safety knowledge and expertise for disaster 
planning was exchanged with partner countries from the North Sea Region. Policy makers, engineers 
and practitioners worked together in order to find a balance and common understanding between the 
different interaction levels of the chain of safety. 
 
The chain of safety has several links (Fig. 2). These links differ from each other in their time scope 
(from long term prevention to medium-term recovery) and aim. Five different links can be 
distinguished: 
• Pro-action: the elimination of structural causes of danger, thereby preventing the development of 
dangerous situations. 
• Prevention: the minimization of risks and the restriction of the consequences of any accidents that 
occur. 
• Preparation: the preparations for the control of accidents, disasters and crises. 
• Response: the operational control of dangerous situations that have occurred, including the 
provision of the necessary assistance. 
• Recovery: the concluding link in the safety chain. Recovery focuses on the return to the normal 
situation, together with evaluations that result in procedural improvements. 
 
 
Figure 2. Chain of Safety 
 
The concept of this chain of safety approach is embraced by the EU Flood Directive (2007/60/EC). 
In this directive it is stated that “Flood risk management plans should focus on prevention, protection 
and preparedness”. In other words, coastal defences are not sufficient: the three first shackles of the 
safety chain are crucial to manage flood risks. Flood risk calculations form the basis for the follow-up 
of the whole chain of safety. 
 
FLOOD RISK CALCULATIONS AS EVALUATION TOOL 
Flanders Hydraulics Research has worked out a methodology for calculating the flood risks for 
several extreme storms according to Verwaest et al (2008) to estimate the number of casualties and 
economic damage at the seafront and in the hinterland.  
 
These flood risk calculations are used as an input for setting up coastal management plans and to 
work out contingency and evacuation plans (Fig. 3). 
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Flood risk calculations present situation
Flood risk reduction after implementation
Design of safety measures
Social cost – benefit analysis
Optimum safety standard + measure
Flood risk calculations present situation
Flood risk reduction after implementation
Design of safety measures
Define damage and victim nuclei
Set up contingency + evacuation plans
a. b. 
 
Figure 3. Scheme for coastal management on the left (a) and disaster planning on the right (b). 
 
Input for coastal management 
In 2007, the Belgian Coastal Division initiated an Integrated Master Plan for Coastal Safety to 
provide a minimum safety standard of once in 1000 year for the entire coastline. As explained in 
Mertens et al (2008) this plan will form the basis for the development of the seafront along the Belgian 
coast in the nearby and distant future (up till 2050) with safety against flooding as its main objective.  
The combined evaluation of environmental impacts, flood risk reductions and costs versus benefits 
will support the selection of integrated defence measures for every weak link. The implementation 
phase of the Master Plan for Coastal Safety is planned between 2010 and 2015. 
 
Weak links 
All weak links have been determined based on stability and breaching calculations of the sea 
defences. According to Verwaest et al (2008) a worst credible storm can result in 3000 casualties, 
mainly on the sea defence itself, and € 3 billion economic damage. At all harbours and several coastal 
communities quay walls and dyke levels are too low, resulting in overflow and breaches during 
extreme storms, thus causing major flooding for dozens of kilometers land inwards (Fig. 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Flooding of the western Belgian coastal zone due to breaches in the sea defences caused by an 
extreme storm event (simulated with the MIKEFLOOD software package). 
  
The results indicate that one third of the coastline needs to be reinforced to withstand extreme 
storm floods, providing a minimum safety standard of once in 1000 year.  
 
Locks and weirs need special attention, as structural strengthening or an adjusted operation is 
needed for these structures to resist the impact of water forces during storms. The contribution of each 
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weak link to the overall number of risks enables us to prioritize specific defence measures in the final 
Master Plan.  
  
As 100% safety can never be guaranteed, risk calculations are used to evaluate the risk reduction 
from and remaining risk after the implementation of a defence measure, which are used as an input for 
the social cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Evaluation of protection measures 
Potential protection measures such as beach or dune nourishments, storm return walls, stilling 
wave basins and storm flood barriers have been selected and are studied to account for their 
environmental impacts in an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), costs vs. benefits and potential 
impacts on tourism. This paper will only highlight the latter two.  
 
In the social cost benefit analysis the costs are calculated as a combination of investment and 
operational (maintenance) costs.  Beach nourishments for examples have to be maintained every 5 
years, while storm return walls can be constructed to last for 50 years or more and thus need 
reinvestment after a certain period. 
 
For the benefits different input parameters are selected. First the safety benefit is calculated as the 
difference between the current flood risk and the remaining flood risk, after implementation of the 
safety measures. A distinction is made between the avoided risk for material damage and the avoided 
risk for victims. The estimate of the value of human life is based on figures about the willingness to 
pay to reduce a certain risk: a household wants to pay 2,4 euro per year to reduce the annual risk for a 
deadly accident to one in a million. These figures match with recommendations for the value of human 
life in the context of traffic accidents in Flanders Region and European studies as the HEATCO 
project. 
 
In a second step an estimate is made for the recreation benefit of certain protection measures. The 
value of an extra surface of dry beach or a second dyke is rated.  Based on inquiries of tourists it was 
determined that 4€ per extra square meter of dry beach is a minimum rate that can be included. 
Because no further details for the value of dykes are available the same rate was given to an extra 
surface of dyke.  
 
These values make is possible to determine whether each safety measure earns itself back after a 
certain period in time. Projects that have a bad benefit-cost ratio, i.e. lower than 1, within the time 
frame of the study (the Master Plan has a time horizon till the year 2050) are negatively rated. To 
include extra recreation values often means that certain measures get a positive rate in the end since 
they earn themselves back more quickly. This is shown in the next example (Table 1). Five safety 
measures are studied for the coastal town of Mariakerke: high beach, low beach (LB), low beach in 
combination with a storm return wall of 0,60 meter, low beach in combination with a storm return wall 
of 1,20 meter and a low beach in combination with a second dyke. As shown in Table 1 only a low 
beach with a high storm return wall earns itself back till 2050. If recreation values are incorporated, all 
measures earn themselves back from 2040 onwards. 
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Table 1.  Benefit cost ratio of different safety measures for a coastal town along the Belgian coastline. A 
benefit-cost ratio higher than one (marked in grey) means the measure earns itself back from that specific 
year onwards. 
Benefit/cost High beach Low beach (LB) LB + 0,60m wall LB + 1,2 m wall LB + 2nd dyke 
till 2020 0,07 0,09 0,11 0,15 0,09 
till 2030 0,24 0,29 0,35 0,48 0,30 
till 2040 0,37 0,47 0,55 0,76 0,48 
till 2050 0,49 0,61 0,73 1,00 0,63 
till 2060 0,58 0,73 0,88 1,21 0,76 
till 2080 0,74 0,94 1,11 1,51 0,97 
till 2100 0,87 1,11 1,31 1,77 1,14 
till 2110 0,93 1,18 1,39 1,89 1,22 
With recreation value      
till 2020 0,20 0,24 0,26 0,30 0,20 
till 2030 0,66 0,78 0,85 0,98 0,65 
till 2040 1,04 1,25 1,34 1,54 1,03 
till 2050 1,36 1,63 1,76 2,03 1,36 
till 2060 1,64 1,97 2,12 2,46 1,63 
till 2080 2,09 2,52 2,69 3,07 2,09 
till 2100 2,45 2,96 3,17 3,61 2,46 
till 2110 2,61 3,15 3,37 3,84 2,61 
 
Since benefits can not always be expressed in monetary values, expert judgement was used to 
evaluated these non-monetary values. They mainly consist of effects on the attractiveness of the sea 
dykes and beaches caused by safety measures. The impact on the open sea view caused by a storm 
return wall on top of a sea dyke can be used as an example. A public inquiry for evaluating these 
impacts was performed with inhabitants and tourists in several coastal towns along the Belgian 
coastline. 
 
Optimum safety standard and measures 
To determine the optimum safety standard results of the social cost benefit analysis (SCBA) can be 
used: until which safety level benefits exceed costs? A distinction between the value of assets and the 
value of human life is needed: the optimal safety standard can differ from place to place thus implying 
a differentiated safety standard for people living along the coastline. Zones where flood risks are 
higher will normally have a higher safety standard. If equal protection for all people has to be 
guaranteed a minimum safety level for the entire coastline needs to be defined.  
 
To justify high safety standards for occasional events such as storm impacts a difference needs to 
be made between the protection of individuals and groups.  
 
The number of victims that may occur during a storm is not socially acceptable. Figure 5 shows 
the Belgian criterion, in force since 2006, for external group risk for companies that produce highly 
explosive materials. It reflects essentially our social aversion to major disasters involving mass 
casualties in a place and / or by an accident.
Thus, a comparison can be made between the victims of a super storm and those that may occur 
during an explosion. Both events can cause a high number of victims. This contrasts with the annual 
number of fatalities caused by traffic accidents. Each year traffic demands many deaths, spread over 
several separate events.
 
The group risk is displayed as a curve in a graph with two logarithmic scaled axes, called the risk 
curve. The vertical axis is the probability of occurrence of an event (per year). Plotted on the horizontal 
axis is the (minimum) number of expected casualties. This risk curve shows the relationship between 
the size of the group (N) and probability (f) that at one time a group of at least that size perishes. 
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For every coastal protection measure a risk curve is drawn: the number of casualties is calculated 
for several storms with a different probability of occurrence. A risk curve is drawn for the reference 
year of the Master Plan (marked as “Risk anno 2000”) and the risk is calculated for the zero option in 
2050 (marked as “Risk anno 2050”). The zero option includes the continuation of current coastal 
policy, without the realisation of the Master Plan. The graph shows that a 250 year storm (≈ storm of 
1953) today would cause 23 deaths and a 1000 year storm event 146. 
 
The criterion for societal risk (marked as “Criterion external group risk”) defines two zones in this 
(fN) graph. To meet the requirements of the external criterion, the risk curve should lie on the left side 
of the graph in the zone marked as "protected". If the remaining risk on casualties is too high (right 
side of the graph), measures need to be taken in order to reduce this risk. These measures consist of 
protection measures (risk is reduced to the left side of the graph = “pro-action” phase) or evacuation 
which has to be prepared by the set-up of contingency plans (“preparation” phase). 
 
To reduce the group risk and thus the number of deaths coastal protection measures are compiled 
for each weak link. The reduction of societal risk depends on the combination of coastal protection 
measures. The range of the reduction of risk is indicated by two curves marked as “Remaining risk 
Maximum reduction” and “Remaining risk Minimum reduction”. They respectively indicate the results 
for the combination of protection measures which realizes a maximum and minimum risk reduction. It 
is noted that both curves always have a remaining risk located on the right side of the graph, i.e. the 
risk for the heaviest storms. The graph shows that, except for very severe storms, the societal risk can 
be reduced to acceptable quantities. 
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Figure 5. Criterion for external group risk. 
 
To design optimal safety measure, results of different evaluation methods are used in the 
framework of the Master Plan. A combination is made between the results of the SCBA and the EIA, 
plus expert judgement for the evaluation of non-monetary values. 
 
Risk based contingency planning 
In the past contingency plans for flooding were mainly based on the principle “Where can we 
shelter the most people?” without taking into account the vulnerability of these areas. Current flood 
risk calculations provide specific information about potential floodable areas and casualty numbers in 
the hinterland and on the sea defence itself during extreme storms. This allows us to identify which 
coastal communities are more vulnerable and to define adequate procedures for the evacuation of 
 COASTAL ENGINEERING 2010 
 
7
citizens. A regional contingency plan for flooding is being set up based on these results in order to 
integrate and harmonize actions that have to be taken at the local level. This plan is being developed in 
cooperation with the Province of West Flanders and governmental organisations responsible for rivers 
and waterways. 
 
Priority areas (nuclei) for evacuation 
A study was performed by Meire et al (2010) which aimed at visualizing the spatial distribution of 
victim risks in so called ‘victim nuclei’ or ‘victim core areas’. The study focuses on observation zones 
(‘aandachtszones’), that are related to weak links in the coastal defence, and observation areas 
(‘aandachtsgebieden’), that are flooded as a consequence of breaches or wave overtopping of the 
coastal protection constructions during different super storm events. 
The visualization of vulnerability differentiation within the inundated areas highly depends on the 
classification method applied to the available geographical data, as it leads to spatial variation of the 
map content. The current data were processed in a GIS environment that offered seven discretization 
methods, allowing to identify none, one or various local subareas in which high victim concentrations 
could be found. The study aimed at defining ‘optimal’ victim nuclei, corresponding to the 
identification of ‘optimal’ class boundaries. 
It was assumed that theoretically, a nucleus could be defined when more than 50% of the total 
number of victims was located in an area that, in proportion to the total flooded area, covered a smaller 
part (i.e. <50% of studied area or zone). It should be noted that the percentages and respective nuclei 
are not to be interpreted as absolute results, as they give an indication of the most vulnerable subzones 
of the study areas. The methodology was applied in such a way that each victim nucleus took up equal 
to or more than 90% of the total expected number of victims in the respective study area (Fig. 6). Such 
a refinement of victim variation without taking (spontaneous or organized) evacuation into account 
will make it possible in the future research phase to delineate priority evacuation areas.  
 
 
Figure 6. Selection of victim nuclei for prioritisation of evacuation during storm events 
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Flood risk calculations as a communicative and operational tool 
Flood risk calculations proved to be a useful tool in setting up contingency plans. The impact of 
several storm events can be shown on flood risk maps, thus providing input for drawing up different 
evacuation maps. The impact of a worst credible storm gives crucial information for the operational 
teams active on the field during storm events. Some examples for which flood risk calculations are 
used in contingency planning: 
 
• Defining priority areas for evacuation; 
• Localising possible evacuation routes and shelters; 
• Drawing up perimeters; 
• Choosing between horizontal vs. vertical evacuation; 
• Communication tool between engineers and experts on the field. 
• Information towards the public; 
 
Having the correct scenario in place in case a storm may occur is of course not sufficient in 
disaster planning.  Knowing who is involved and performing exercises is often more important. 
Managers, planners and experts on the field need to communicate in the same language. Visual 
information, such as flood (risk) maps, can help to improve this dialogue. 
 
FLOOD DIRECTIVE 
As an extra input for disaster planning along the seaside, combined flood risk calculations for sea 
and river flooding as well as cross border flooding are taken into account for the implementation of the 
European Flood Directive. In this perspective a first attempt was made in the framework of the 
European projects COMRISK and Safecoast to link different flood risk models and develop cross 
border flood risk maps. Recent flood risk calculations for the master plan will be evaluated and 
compared with Dutch data as a starting point for future European flood risk maps. 
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